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Executive Summary 
This research addresses the problem of how to (1) value architectural options 
that deliver capabilities to the warfighter not inherently measured in dollar values and 
(2)  conduct a trade study of architectural options, the option’s cost, and the option’s 
risk to support the affordability mandate for a more effective and efficient acquisition 
decision-making process. The research models acquisition as a sequential decision 
process with an options framework but with two significant distinctions: First, it 
identifies and values system architectural options available in the system design, 
and not options on the project, and second, it measures capabilities in terms of 
mission effectiveness compatible with how defense managers think. Architectural 
options provide flexibility to deal with technical and operational uncertainty. The 
research contributes to the performance of trade studies in acquisition through the 
definition of architectural options in terms consistent with defense acquisition 
(capabilities and not cash flows) and a theory for how program managers can value 
the capabilities those options provide. The research is intended to support the 
evolutionary acquisition of system capabilities. As RADM Rowden (2014), the 
director of Surface Warfare stated, 
We cannot afford to build ships that are retired because they have 
been outpaced by the threat; rather, they will need to be retired 
because they have reached the end of their service life. Defined 
interfaces and modular designs will treat capability as a commodity, 
enabling continuous modernization to stay one step ahead of the 
threat. These “designed-in” features will dramatically lower the 
complexity of modernizing ships, reducing the time spent in overhauls, 
increasing operational availability, and reducing total ownership cost.   
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Valuation of Capabilities and System 
Architectural options to Meet Affordability 
Requirement 
Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquires systems to deliver 
capabilities needed by the warfighter. Acquisition of a system starts with defining 
capability gaps and covers the system development life cycle from initial 
conceptualization to system production and delivery. Several challenges continue to 
plague the acquisition process of new systems; the adoption of a real options 
framework to evaluate architecture design might help address these challenges. In 
very complex systems for dynamic military environments, it is inevitable that user 
needs and operational requirements will change. While change is foreseeable, the 
exact nature of the change is not. The real options framework is intended to value 
and defend the inclusion of flexibility in system architectures to deal with uncertainty 
in technology and operational needs and ensure that the system delivers value to 
stakeholders over the span of its intended life cycle. Flexible system architectures 
hold out the possibility of systems that can evolve and adapt to changing operational 
and technical needs in order to achieve affordable programs over the long term. This 
research report describes a framework for applying real options to value flexibility in 
system architectures.  
Acquisition Background 
A capability is a system’s enduring ability to generate a desired operational 
outcome or effect in the context of its environment. The U.S. DoD uses a capability-
driven process to determine capabilities needed by the warfighter. The capability-
based analysis (CBA) is governed by the Joint Capability Integration Development 
System (JCIDS). The intent of a capability-based acquisition model is to remain 
solution neutral to remove any bias toward a particular system or technology. CBA 
focuses on what the warfighter needs rather than how the needs can be delivered. 
Moreover, it emphasizes the combination of materiel or system solutions with non-
materiel solutions achieved through what is called doctrine, organization, training, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOT_LPF) changes. There are 
challenges with the CBA approach, among them the difficulty of envisioning abstract 
capabilities without also considering how those capabilities are delivered.  
Under diminishing budgets yet a constant (or even a growing) threat 
environment, the DoD must be able to acquire and deliver capabilities more 
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affordably. The Defense Acquisition System develops and fields systems to meet the 
requirements defined by JCIDS. In 2010, Dr. Carter, while serving as under 
secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics (USD[AT&L]), issued a 
memo for the Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative to improve the efficiency of the 
acquisition process. Part of the BBP initiative is to mandate affordability as a 
requirement when considering systems to acquire. Affordability is intended to ensure 
program success by balancing system performance, total ownership cost, and 
schedule while also considering the DoD’s long-range investment plans. Two 
additional USD(AT&L) memos further addressed the incorporation of affordability 
considerations into the Defense Acquisition System.  The affordability target is 
treated by the program manager as a key performance parameter that is used in 
pre–Milestone B decision-making and systems engineering trade-off analysis. New 
programs need to produce an affordability analysis pre–Milestone A, including an 
affordability element in the analysis of alternatives and a systems engineering trade-
off analysis pre–Milestone B. The trade-off analysis should show how the program 
costs vary against the major design parameters as well as the projected schedule. 
The BPP initiative also calls on program managers to pay attention to spiral 
upgrades because it is apparent that systems will have to be upgraded in order to 
continue providing value during anticipated long operational lives. 
Instituting the intent of the memo requires both a cultural shift in how the DoD 
views system architecture and programs as well as the tools, methods, and 
processes to support affordability analysis. The perspective of this research is that 
the acquisition system is a sociotechnical system, or an enterprise system consisting 
of people, processes, and data that are used to acquire systems that are the output 
of the acquisition process. Letting the sociotechnical perspective inform the research 
approach, this paper emphasizes that transforming how the DoD conducts 
acquisition to make it more efficient requires not just tools but also cultural change. I 
believe that the foremost needed change in perspective is for the DoD to start 
thinking about systems not as a point solution to a well-defined set of requirements 
but as a set of architectural options that will allow the system to adapt and change to 
shifting capability needs and threats over its lifetime. Koenig, Nalchajian, and 
Hootman (2009), from Naval Sea Systems Command, echoed this change in 
perspective when they remarked that conventional decision analysis methods are 
oriented to decision-making under certainty, which is inappropriate for the acquisition 
of ships that require the evaluation of large, risky expenditures for a long-lived 
investment. The defense acquisition process demonstrates and acknowledges that 
systems must change in the increasingly planned use of system spiral upgrades. 
However, the success of spiral upgrades is premised on the specification of a 
system architecture that will accommodate these changes. Designing such a system 
architecture is fraught with difficulty. To illustrate some of the challenges, consider 
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the U.S. Army’s lightweight counter mortar radar system (LCMR), which is part of a 
the Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) system of systems. In the first 
spiral of the development and acquisition process, there was a trade-off decision to 
have a smaller hardware unit to save on weight and then make up for the smaller 
hardware’s lower signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) performance with software that could 
provide a higher virtual SNR through a sampling algorithm. However, in the second 
spiral iteration to acquire additional capabilities for when the LCMR was integrated 
with the C-RAM, it was found that the trade-off decision to compensate for the lower 
hardware SNR with software in the first spiral led to an unacceptable time delay. As 
a result, a costly redesign of the LCMR software ensued to reduce the time delay. 
This very brief description of a complex acquisition program highlights the difficulty in 
making decisions because of the sequencing of decisions, the uncertainty involved, 
and the constantly evolving needs of our military. What was missing in this case was 
the perspective to define and value capabilities over the entire life of the system and 
feedback those valuations into a system architecture that can be affordably adapted 
to deliver those capabilities. 
Acquisition Issues 
This section reviews five of the main issues that architectural options can help 
address in DoD acquisition. 
1. Complexity 
The DoD tends to acquire highly complex technological systems. The 
complexity is manifested as technology risk in the system and as long 
development times to iterate through design-test-build cycles. Technology 
risk arises because many systems are based on unproven technologies. 
Project development teams are uncertain about how the technology will 
perform and what issues might arise during both development and 
operation of the technology. This is epistemic uncertainty, which is 
resolved by gaining knowledge through modeling, analysis, simulation, 
and experimentation. The implication for this paper is that it is only under 
uncertainty—in this case, technical uncertainty due to complexity—that 
flexibility has value. 
2. Development Lead-time 
The system acquisition process is a long process, with the average 
military project lasting almost 10 years (Charette, 2008). The high-level 
architectural decisions are among the first technical decisions made in the 
design process. The dilemma is that these early decisions are made under 
the greatest amount of uncertainty. The implication for the research is that 
architectural decisions, which are the earliest design decisions, have 
significant impact. If the architecture is designed with options to provide 
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flexibility, then it is possible to adapt the system design later as 
operational uncertainty and technical uncertainty are resolved. 
3. Development Methods 
Systems are often designed and built to provide full capabilities in the first 
initial delivery of the system. This is one aspect of the development 
process contributing to very long development times for some programs. 
Acquisition is shifting to an evolutionary acquisition strategy that fields the 
initial system with operationally acceptable capabilities and then adds new 
capabilities in subsequent increments. A benefit of the evolutionary 
approach is that the increments need not be done if the operational 
environment changes, budgets change, or technology changes. Another 
related approach to acquiring capabilities is via systems of systems, which 
are managerial independent systems that interoperate in such a way to 
provide unique and useful capabilities. A real options approach to systems 
engineering is best matched with one of the evolutionary types of design 
processes or a system-of-systems engineering approach. A traditional 
systems engineering process is not amenable to a real options approach 
because if all of the capabilities are delivered at once in a single system 
without consideration of future upgrades, then there is no role for options.  
4. Opportunities As Well As Risks 
When dealing with risk, the systems engineering and project management 
concentrate on the downside risk and take steps to mitigate or avoid the 
risk or reduce the consequences of the risk in the system design. What is 
often ignored is the potential upside of an uncertain event that the system 
could take advantage of. A real options approach values the upside 
opportunities as well as the downside risks associated with architectural 
decisions. 
5. Changing Technology 
In some cases, such as information technology (IT), it is important to 
design the system with the expectation that computing capabilities will 
grow exponentially and the computer portions of the system will be 
updated in a shorter cycle than other components.  
Research Goal 
This research is targeted to acquisition process efficiency and, more 
specifically, to enhancing Acquisition decision-makers’ understanding of the 
relationship between system architecture, capabilities, and affordability. The 
research models acquisition as a sequential decision process with an options 
framework but with two significant distinctions: First, it identifies and values system 
architectural options available in the system design, and not options on the project, 
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and second, it measures capabilities in terms of mission effectiveness compatible 
with how defense managers think. The research develops the theory, builds a 
computational tool, and demonstrates how to identify and value architectural options 
using a case study of a Navy system. The research contributes to the early trade 
studies in acquisition through the definition of architectural options in terms 
consistent with defense acquisition (capabilities and not cash flows) and a theory for 
how program managers can value the capabilities that those options provide. The 
research contributes to the design of systems that can be affordably developed to 
deliver value over their entire expected service life via a spiral acquisition process. 
The research also contributes to the incorporation of flexibility into system 
architectures through the concepts derived from real options.  
Research Issues 
The research addresses the following research issues: 
1. how to define options in system architectures,  
2. how to value military capabilities, 
3. how architectural optionals interact with one another, and 
4. how to link architectural options to the acquisition decision process for 
affordability analysis. 
The following sections explain how the paper addresses these issues in our 
architectural options framework. 
Research Approach 
This research project is premised on the idea that delivering affordable 
capabilities starts with system architecture decisions that must be part of the trade-
off decisions between performance, cost, and schedule. Affordability must consider 
the entire service life of the system. It is probable—in fact, most existing systems 
have illustrated—that the needs and subsequent system requirements will change 
over the life of the system. For example, the IT on a ship will become obsolete and 
require replacement in order to maintain value. The system architecture must be 
designed so that these, and other less obvious changes, can be accommodated in 
the future; otherwise, when the architecture is not designed for these changes, the 
upgrades become very costly. 
The systems engineering process and the acquisition process are designed 
to deliver systems that meet stated requirements at a particular point in time. Many 
designs do not accommodate for changes in the system environment in terms of 
threats, changes in technology, or other external changes. To make good decisions 
justified by the available data, the program manager needs to do the following:  
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 Link architectural options and decisions to needed capabilities. 
Achieving more or less of a particular capability usually implies a 
change in the system architecture, which will then in turn affect other 
system capabilities, including desired future capabilities.  
 Deal with the uncertainty in the underlying data, model predictions, and 
future needs, as well as the risk that emanates from those 
uncertainties.  
 Value capabilities in terms of mission effectiveness and performance. 
Normally, the units of different capabilities will be incompatible and 
there will be more than a few that must be simultaneously traded off, 
limiting the efficacy of simple two-dimensional graphs. For example, in 
ship design, three design parameters—displacement, endurance, and 
speed—must be traded off simultaneously along with other 
architecturally significant design parameters.  
 Account for how present decisions will affect future decisions. The 
systems engineering community knows that early decisions impact 
later system design as well as acquisition decisions. An essential 
characteristic of any decision support must leave flexibility—in this 
paper’s approach, defined as architectural options—that will 
accommodate future decisions affordably. 
It is under uncertainty that architectural options have value. If there were no 
uncertainty, there would be no risk and no need for architectural options. This 
research subtask investigates the nature of acquisition uncertainty, risk, and 
capability needs and then develops a framework to model and link them together in 
a causal network. 
Real Options  
The concept of real options is taken from the financial options on which they 
are based. Real options allow the holder of the option to exercise the option if 
conditions are favorable, but the holder is not obligated to exercise the option if 
conditions are unfavorable (Trigeorgis, 1995). Consequently, the value of options is 
that they allow for the upside potential while limiting the downside risk. Options only 
have value in the face of uncertainty and when that uncertainty is expected to be 
resolved before all of the investment decisions must be made. This situation is what 
is faced by advanced weapon system projects. During system development of 
advanced weapon systems, the uncertainty is due to technical and operational 
sources. Project success is only apparent after the project starts and progresses. A 
real options valuation considers the fact that decisions are made sequentially and 
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that the decision-maker will use all available information at the time the decision is 
made.  
Real options are based on the valuation of the underlying asset whose value 
is modeled as a stochastic process. In finance, the underlying asset is a tradeable 
stock and the stochastic process is an extension of the historic volatility and trend of 
the stock using Brownian motion. In finance, the Black-Scholes equation is used to 
value call and put options (Trigeorgis, 1995). For real options, selection of the 
underlying asset is less clear, identifying the volatility is more difficult, and there are 
several alternative approaches to model the stochastic process. Formulating 
architectural design in the context of real options allows valuation of architectural 
project options that in turn allows for both risk reduction and the possibility of 
exploiting upside potential if it should arise.  
Real options give the right but not a symmetric obligation to evolve the 
system and enhance the opportunities for strategic growth by making future follow-
on investments (e.g., case of reuse, exploring new markets, expanding the range of 
services while leaving the architecture intact). Since flexibility has a value under 
uncertainty, the value of these options lies in the enhanced flexibility to cope with 
uncertainty (i.e., the evolutionary changes). The importance of the real options 
concept cannot be overemphasized: It gives the architects/stakeholders an ability to 
reason about a crucial but previously intangible source of value and to factor the 
ability of an architecture to adapt into the tradeoff analysis and acquisition decision-
making. 
Real options are both a means to value investments as well as a means to 
define flexibility in system deployment (Trigeorgis, 2001). Koenig et al. (2009) 
discussed the high level of uncertainty, and hence risk, associated with conventional 
engineering economic analysis of projects that have long operational lives. They 
suggested that the DoD environment is actually rich with options, but until now, there 
has been no quantitative means to value them and incorporate them into the 
acquisition decision process. In fact, quite an extensive amount of research has 
been conducted on the proposed or actual use of real options with project planning 
and acquisition.  
Real options are better at valuing investments in situations where the 
decision-maker has flexibility to make changes in the future and the environment is 
uncertain. Traditional approaches to valuing investments based on discounted cash 
flows are inadequate in dealing with both flexibility and uncertainty. To illustrate, 
consider a project to build a satellite. The investment in the satellite might be 
unattractive based on a pure net-present value analysis, but it may be that by 
launching the satellite, the organization has the opportunity to add additional 
valuable capabilities in the future. These possible future capabilities are not 
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considered in the traditional value analysis, and it is these possible future 
capabilities, called options, that real options values. In uncertain environments when 
there is flexibility to make subsequent decisions, traditional valuation approaches 
undervalue flexibility in the system. 
Architectural Options Framework 
This section describes the method I used to identify system architectural 
options and to value those options. Figure 1 shows the overall concept that today’s 
capability needs will evolve over time to future capability needs. Architectural options 
are needed to enable fulfillment of these future capability needs. Incorporating them 
into the architecture today requires understanding their value—hence, real options.  
 
Figure 1. Architectural Options and Relationship to Capability Needs 
System architecture is the representation of the structure of a system 
embodied by its elements, the logical and physical relationships between the 
elements, their relationships with the environment, and the principles or concept 
guiding the system's design and evolution over time. The types of elements and 
relationships in an architecture depend on the architectural view of operational, 
functional, or physical. A system architecture is divided into three main views—
operational, functional, and physical architectures—with mappings showing how 
elements in one view are related to elements in the other views. Collectively, the 
three views provide a holistic model of how the system fulfills its mission. This paper 
considers all three architectural views in this research. The views are all included in 
Department of Defense Architectural Framework. 
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The development of a system architecture is driven by a design concept that 
gives form to ideas about how a system’s functions and behaviors maximize 
stakeholder value.  The architect must balance the many competing needs and 
objectives present in modern, complex system design projects. A design concept is 
a central part of an architecture because it describes how the system's form 
embodies working principles and how functions and behaviors are mapped to 
physical components. The concept guides future design decisions. Many acquisition 
professionals are familiar with operational concepts as described in the concept of 
operations (CONOPS) document. Likewise, design concepts underlie the functioning 
and physical structure of the system. Oftentimes, the architecture informally or 
inexplicitly defines the concept. 
The architectural options approach involves the following steps: 
1. identify sources of uncertainty, 
2. define measures for the capabilities, 
3. model uncertainty using scenarios, 
4. partition the system architecture into modules, 
5. define architectural options in the architecture, 
6. value options, and 
7. present the valuation to the decision-maker. 
These steps are described in the following subsections. 
Classification of Program Uncertainty, Risk, and Capability 
Needs 
Uncertainty is the state of not knowing something exactly, and this is a 
pervasive state in the design of systems. Uncertainty in a system can arise in the 
operational environment, technology environment, and the acquisition process. 
Uncertainty can be classified as either epistemic uncertainty or aleatory uncertainty. 
Epistemic uncertainty is due to our incomplete knowledge of the system, threats, or 
operational environment and is especially prevalent in the early stages of the system 
design process. Through research and development, these uncertainties are 
systematically removed during the acquisition process. Aleatory uncertainty is due to 
the inherent variability of the system parameters, system input, or system 
environment. Aleatory uncertainty is the irreducible uncertainty; it cannot be 
removed and is quantified in a statistical manner. 
The uncertainty most relevant to architectural options is operational 
uncertainty and technical uncertainty. Systems are acquired with very long expected 
operational lives. The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) aircraft carrier is being 
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acquired with the intention of beginning its operational phase in 2016. The ship is 
designed to operate for 50 years—the planned disposal date is 2066. Given this long 
operational life, it is impossible to accurately forecast how naval warfare and the 
capability needs of the aircraft carrier will change during these years.  
Systems are exposed to uncertainty in their technical environment in that the 
technology will change and technological opportunities will emerge over the 
system’s operational life. Technology advances in both a predictable, evolutionary 
manner as well as in a disruptive manner. Technology evolution leads to 
obsolescence of technology and the need to periodically update the technology. The 
simplest obsolescence is when the technology can be replaced with a newer 
technology that has the same interface. Obsolescence that involves interface 
changes is more difficult to deal with, and the most difficult obsolescence to handle 
is if the functionality changes or there is a disruptive technology shift that leads to a 
new design concept incompatible with the system’s architecture. A technology can 
become functionally obsolete because it is subsumed by another technology or a 
different design concept.  
Systems are exposed to uncertainty in their operational environment. The 
operational environment is characterized by the missions that a system is designed 
for, the capabilities it needs to fulfill those missions, and the nature of the threats it 
will encounter.  
To enable this strategy, the system architecture must be designed to support 
the incremental addition of capabilities. Sources of uncertainty are changes to the 
operational environment, to the funding availability, and to the technical 
environment. Changes to the operational environment flow down to the system and 
change system requirements.  
Some uncertainty can be resolved, such as with technology evolution, which 
might be predicted to continue following Moore’s Law in the near to mid-term future. 
In this case, the uncertainty is not in technology evolution but in the rate of growth 
and the implications of that growth. 
Measuring Capabilities 
A capability is defined as the ability to achieve a desired effect under 
specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways across 
DOTMLPF to perform a set of tasks to execute a specified course of action (JCIDS). 
The term ways and means refers to the non-materiel components and the materiel 
components of the capability, respectively. A capability is essentially a high-level 
operational requirement expressed in language that the stakeholder understands. A 
measure of effectiveness (MOE) is a measure that corresponds to the delivery of a 
capability in the system’s expected environment. MOEs are defined from the 
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stakeholder's perspective, specifically the acquirer. A good MOE is linked to the 
desired end state, has a strong relationship between cause and effect, and is 
observable and quantifiable. A MOE is defined without reference to the design 
solution and should in theory be a useful measure regardless of what technology, 
design, or process is used to meet the capability needs. 
A measure of performance (MOP) is a measure of the performance of a 
system function. A MOP is defined from the technical viewpoint of designing a 
system that will fulfill the mission as characterized by the MOEs. Since a capability is 
fulfilled by one or more system functions, a MOP that measures the performance of 
a function will consequently map to a capability via the function.  
Architectural Options 
The first research issue, architectural options, is part of the system design 
process and requires awareness of the design team to think about options as well as 
creativity to design system architectures around those options. The need for 
architectural options in systems is to provide flexibility for the system in adapting to 
uncertainty in the operational and technical environment. As discussed in the 
Literature Review section, there is little work in identifying options in the architecture 
as opposed to the more common definition of options on the project. 
The architectural options are all part of the same system and consequently 
will be interdependent—in essence, a system describes a portfolio of options. The 
interdependence must be included in the model since changes in any one option will 
affect others. 
The system architectural options must be linked to the capabilities they 
provide and incorporated into the acquisition decision process. Linking options to 
capabilities entails understanding how the architectural options contribute to system 
performance and measuring them in a way that they can be included in the trade-off 
analysis conducted by the program manager and others for affordability analysis. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the sources of uncertainty, what actions 
could be taken to deal with the uncertainty, and how architectural options enable 
those actions. For example, future operations might require greater use of special 
operations forces, a source of operational uncertainty. A capability gap may be the 
Navy’s ability to deploy these forces. An action could be the development of a 
special operations module on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) — an “add component” 
action. The add component action is enabled by architectural options that include 
the infrastructure support, weight/space support, open interfaces, and ability to form 
modules. 
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Figure 2. Relationship Between Uncertainty and Architecture Options 
Clustering into Modules 
Modularity and open architecture concepts are important enablers to a real 
options approach to system architecture. Architecture modularity is achieved by 
partitioning the system into self-contained subsystems that deliver complete 
functions independent of other subsystems. The interfaces between subsystems 
should use open standards and be transparent to the greatest extent possible. 
Another important consideration is the expected technical operational use of the 
subsystem. Computer and IT subsystems tend to become obsolete much faster than 
most hardware-oriented subsystems. Separating these subsystems into self-
contained subsystems or designing them for easy updating of software increases the 
modularity of the system. 
Mission modules apply the modularity concept to the operational architecture 
because they provide flexibility to respond to different missions. The best example of 
mission modularity is the LCS, which has mission modules planned for 
antisubmarine warfare, surface warfare, and mine warfare. 
A module has high internal cohesion and low coupling with other elements in 
the system. Ulrich and Eppinger (2011) defined three types of modularity: slot 
modular, bus modular, and sectional modular. Slot-modular components are defined 
with unique interfaces. Bus-modular components are defined with a common 
interface. Sectional-modular components can be attached to other modules by 
means of a standard interface.  
Interdependence 
A module has low coupling with other modules and high internal cohesion. 
Cohesion and coupling are two measures of the interactions between components in 
a system. Cohesion is a measure of the degree to which components within a 
subsystem interact with each other to perform a single function or small set of 
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related functions. Coupling is the degree of the interaction between subsystems. To 
paraphrase, cohesion is within a single subsystem and coupling is between 
subsystems. This discussion uses the generic term interactions; however, it is 
possible to define cohesion with respect to other characteristics such as engineering 
knowledge domains, type of material or manufacturing process, or the functions that 
the components perform. For example, the hydraulic subsystem in an airplane is 
defined to be cohesive in terms of the domain knowledge required to design and 
develop the hydraulics.  
A heuristic is a rule of thumb that, in the context of architecture, describes a 
best practice that creates a modular and flexible architecture via architectural 
options.  The heuristic to maximize the cohesion of subsystems and to minimize the 
coupling between subsystems has proven useful again and again. The reasons for 
this heuristic are to make an architecture that is more easily understood; to make 
partitioning the system into subsystems easier; to minimize the number of interfaces 
between subsystems; and to make changing, maintenance, and supportability of the 
system easier. Each of these objectives is discussed in this section. First, a system 
that has high cohesion within subsystems and low coupling between them is easier 
to understand because it has fewer interactions at the system level. The interactions 
are mostly within the subsystem level, which is hidden in the architecture level. The 
low coupling between subsystems means that there are fewer interfaces between 
subsystems. This makes the project easier to manage since interfaces are 
negotiated and then become configuration control items via the interface control 
document. Minimizing coupling works because the interactions between subsystems 
are generally more difficult to manage and control due to how most systems 
engineering projects are performed. In general, each subsystem is assigned to a 
subteam— a small group that is more easily managed by the project manager—for 
completion. All of the interactions inside of a subsystem are within the control of the 
subteam. The interactions between subsystems will involve two or more subteams. 
The coordination of the work of these subteams is more difficult and requires greater 
effort and negotiation. Consequently, by minimizing coupling, you minimize the need 
for coordination between subteams. 
When subsystems are loosely coupled, one of the subsystems can be 
changed without or with only minimal need to change the other subsystem. In other 
words, the subsystems are highly independent. Changes to one do not necessarily 
infer changes to the other. In system development, this independence between 
subsystems is good because it reduces the need for coordination between the 
subteams developing each subsystem. This property is also beneficial to upgrades 
of the system, because one subsystem could be upgraded without necessitating 
upgrades to the other subsystem. In general, it is found that coupling is detrimental 
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to system development because it prevents making changes to components 
independent of the whole. 
Coupling between two components is due to the interaction between the 
components, classified per the types shown in Table 1. The interaction types are 
used to populate a design structure matrix (DSM). The DSM shows each component 
in what is essentially an N2 matrix and the interactions between them as either a 0 
or a 1.  







Computer algorithms are needed to help identify potential modules because the size 
and complexity of system architectures preclude a manual approach. This paper 
adopts a clustering algorithm from Thebeau (2001), who defined a cost for each 
module based on interactions with penalties, adjustable by the user, for cluster size 
as well as a few other parameters to control the algorithm. The algorithm uses a 
bidding process with hill climbing to search for an optimal solution. The top graph of 
Figure 3 shows one of the DSMs evaluated in this paper; the bottom graph shows 
how the clustering algorithm formed modules. A good modularization has most of 
the interactions inside a module and very few interactions between modules. The 
results for the simple case show only ten interactions outside and between modules. 
In the practice of forming modules, the algorithm is executed iteratively with 
the user changing parameters or the DSM, re-executing the algorithm, and repeating 
the cycle until a satisfactory clustering of modules is formed.  The point of the 
algorithm is to speed up the generation of alternative architecture modularization 
concepts, but the algorithm does not necessarily automatically generate the 
modularization that is eventually used. 
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Figure 3. The Initial Design Structure Matrix  and the System Clustered into 
Modules 
Architecture Heuristics 
Table 2 shows the main architecture heuristics. These heuristics are used to 
design system architectures to create architectural options. 
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New DSM Matrix; 17-Jul-2013 12:23:47;   Total Cost: 4640
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Table 2. List of Architecture Heuristics 
Heuristics 
Architecture models to standardize data, processes, and structure 
Function partitioning 
Partition hardware and software 
Partition high-risk technologies 
Specialization versus generalization 
Interfaces used industry-supported standards 
The interface between modules is important; Table 3 shows the general types 
of interfaces. The architectural options require the interfaces between the modular 
subsystems to be defined appropriately. 
Table 3. Interface Types 
Interface Type Description 
Connector Facilitates interaction of energy, material, or 
information flows 
Isolator Inhibits interaction of energy, material, or 
information flows 
Converters Alters the flow in the interaction 
Scenarios 
A scenario is a possible outcome, usually operational in nature, and is 
modeled as a node in a decision tree (see Figure 4). Scenario modeling is a 
standard approach in systems engineering.  
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Figure 4. Scenarios in a Decision Tree 
Valuation of Options 
The valuation of architectural options is performed with a decision-tree 
structure because the uncertainty is defined by the future operational and technical 
scenarios. The decision tree is represented mathematically using set theory.  Let ݐ 
denote a time period in the set 1 … ܶ. In each time period, the decision-maker 
makes a decision in whether to invest in an option. Let ݔ௧௜ denote the execution of 
option ݅	in time period ݐ.  
The objective is to maximize the MOP, which varies with time ݐ, the 
operational scenario ݇	that the system encounters, and which options ݅	are active in 
the system. The real options model assumes that there is a fixed lower-level 
performance denoted by ௜݂ 	and a variable component denoted by ߣ௧௜. The objective 
function is 








The decision-maker evaluates the values in the decision tree for all terminal 
nodes and then works backward until reaching the root node.  The value at each 
node is represented with a value vector ݒ௝ that stores the accumulated benefits and 
costs from the downstream nodes.  
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Presentation of Results 
The decision tree valuation results are best presented as architectural trade-
off curves showing the capabilities measured by MOEs/MOPs and the cost. See 
Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Notional Architecture Trade-Off Curve 
Publications and Dissemination of Results 
A paper will be published at the 2014 Acquisition Research Symposium to 
illustrate the method. Additionally, a journal article is in preparation on the valuation 
of real options for the phased acquisition of system capabilities. 
Related Research Efforts 
LCDR Heather Skowron, a student at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
is doing her master’s thesis to specify a phased plan for the Coast Guard to develop 
and deploy a manpower determination system, which is a workflow system for the 
Coast Guard to analyze the workload requirements for ships and determine the type 
and number of crew. Skowron is designing a modular system architecture and 
mapping it to a schedule that will deliver capabilities in an evolutionary manner every 
six months. The architecture is designed to utilize commercial standards to preserve 
openness, and it allows Coast Guard decision-makers options on whether to 
implement certain system elements depending on their valuation of the capabilities 
provided. Skowron is expected to complete her thesis by May 2014. A second NPS 
student, LCDR Kara Lavin, is expected to continue this line of research for the Coast 
Guard when she does her thesis later in 2014. 
Progam Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems 1.0 is interested in 
combat system flexibility and system modularity. It presented this research topic 
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during the 2014 Naval Research Requirements Fair. I spoke to the research sponsor 
and plan to submit a proposal to do this research, which will build upon the research 
conducted in this project.  
Related Work 
This research seeks to develop a model and method to use real options to 
value system architectural options and is consequently related to research in system 
flexibility and in real options. Flexibility has long been desired in the design of 
systems in order to deal with anticipated uncertainty in the system's development 
and operational lifetime (Giachetti, Martinez, Sáenz, & Chen, 2003; Ross, Rhodes, & 
Hastings, 2008). In the past decade, the theory of real options has increasingly been 
seen as a means to define and value flexible investment decisions in a project (Mun, 
2006; Trigeorgis, 1996). Real options, inspired by the use of financial options, allow 
the option holder to exercise the option if conditions are favorable, but the holder is 
not obligated to exercise the option if conditions are unfavorable; the overall result of 
this process allows for upside potential and limiting the downside risk (Trigeorgis, 
1996). These options have value because of the decision flexibility they provide 
(Brosch, 2008). To date, almost all applications of real options have been what is 
termed options on projects (Wang & de Neufville, 2006). Typical examples include 
the following: Giachetti (2012) described a scenario where real options to delay, 
scale up, scale down, or abandon the project are applied to enterprise system 
projects in the DoD. Pennock, Rouse, and Kollar (2007) applied the Black-Scholes 
equation to ship acquisition. Angelis, Ford, and Dillard (2013) described a case 
study of applying real options to the Army’s acquisition of the Javelin anti-tank 
weapon system in which they considered three alternatives to provide the capability. 
Real options on projects are available in all projects and have been applied in the IT 
industry, in the oil and gas exploration industry, and to research and development 
portfolios.  
What is far less common is the identification and application of options in the 
system architecture design itself. Wang and Neufville (2006) provided an example of 
a real option designed into a system, where they described the design of a bridge 
across the Tagus River in Portugal. The bridge was being designed for automobile 
traffic, yet the government realized that in the future, they might want to also have 
trains cross the Tagus River. Building two separate bridges, one for each mode of 
transportation, is more expensive than if a single bridge were designed to handle 
both. Yet, whether rail transport would ever be realized was uncertain. The 
engineers proposed a real option designed into the bridge of building supports 
capable of supporting two decks: one for automobile traffic and a second for rail 
traffic. The bridge would initially be built exclusively for automobile traffic, but the 
beefier supports created the system architectural option for adding the second deck 
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for rail traffic. Real options valuation lets the decision-makers analyze whether the 
additional investment is warranted, and in this case, it was. This example illustrates 
a significant difference between real options on projects versus in projects. To obtain 
real options in projects, the systems engineers must identify future uncertainties and 
design the options into the system architecture so that the option for realizing that 
flexibility is available in the future. The research in identifying and designing options 
into system architecture is far less realized than the traditional stream of research 
into real options (Engle & Browning, 2008). Burrman, Zhang, and Babovic (2009) 
examined real options and applied them to the architecture of a maritime domain 
protection system in which the options are defined in terms of dollar value for costs 
and benefits. Engel and Browning (2008) examined how to define architectural 
options and show a valuation scheme of mapping the standard Black-Scholes 
equation to terminology for modular architectures. Mohr (2009) used real options to 
value the flexibility of modular cabins able to accommodate changing passenger 
demands. Silver and de Weck (2007) used a graph to model the switching cost 
between different architectural configurations. Their analysis used cost. What Silver 
and de Weck’s research has in common is that the value of the option is entirely in 
financial terms. 
An issue in the defense sector is how to value options in terms of capabilities. 
Mun and Housel (2010) presented a collection of tools based on real options that 
uses the concept of knowledge value added (KVA) as a surrogate for the benefits 
derived from an option. The KVA approach addressed the contradiction of using 
money to value options for the military. Ford, Housel, and Dillard (2010) used KVA in 
conjunction with simulation models for the analysis of alternative unmanned aerial 
vehicles, and they presented data where a Predator has a KVA of 943, versus a 
KVA of 1222 for Sky Warrior. The question is, what do these unitless KVA values 
mean to an acquisition program manager? The unitless KVA measures have no 
correspondence to how program managers, systems engineers, and other 
stakeholders think about the system's performance and capabilities, which severely 
limits their applicability. The paper determines that there is a need for valuation in 
terms already used within the acquisition community.  
The majority of work on real options deals with options on projects, such as 
whether to delay, expand, contract, or make similar changes to the project 
dimensions. A few researchers have examined real options on the architecture, 
which are options designed into the architecture by engineers. Traditional options 
theory values the costs and benefits of options in terms of dollar values. However, 
military capabilities are measured in terms of MOEs and performance. A model of 
architectural options that deliver military capabilities needs to utilize units that have 
meaning to the stakeholders. Military stakeholders need to understand the trade-off 
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between the architectural options and how it affects capabilities, as opposed to the 
industry practice of valuing options in strictly dollar terms. 
In summary, the research on architectural options is underdeveloped, and 
incorporation of non-financial measures of the value of options has not been widely 
examined. Both these issues are critical to a more efficient acquisition process that 
emphasizes affordability. 
Summary 
The research project developed a method to identify and value architectural 
options. The approach is to identify uncertainty that the system will face, model it in 
a decision tree via scenarios, identify a means to measure system capabilities, 
define system modules and architectural options, apply real options to value the 
options, and then present the results to a decision-maker in the form of architecture 
trade-off curves. The intent of the research is to aid a decision-maker in identifying 
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